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ABSTRACT:

The Theaetetus’ ‘secret doctrine’ and the
Sophist’s ‘battle between gods and giants’ have
long fascinated Plato scholars. I show that the
passages systematically parallel one another.
Each presents two substantive positions that
are advanced on behalf of two separate parties,
related to one another by their comparative sophistication or refinement. Further, those parties
and their respective positions are characterized
in substantially similar terms. On the basis of
these sustained parallels, I argue that the two
passages should be read together, with each
informing and constraining an interpretation of
the other.
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Plato, as is well known, presents the Sophist
as a literary companion to the Theaetetus. Most
conspicuously, the Sophist’s first line—Theodorus: ‘We’ve come at the proper time by yesterday’s agreement, Socrates’ (216a1)—directly
answers the last lines of the Theaetetus—Socrates: ‘let us meet here again in the morning,
Theodorus’ (210d3-4).1 In this way and others,
Plato rhetorically flags the Sophist as a continuation of the recorded conversation begun at
Theaetetus 143d1.
The Sophist does not merely pick up where
the Theaetetus leaves off, however. The two dialogues are more intimately connected. In what
is perhaps the most famous example, the Sophist fills out the Theaetetus’ discussion of false
judgment. Rather than simply branching out in
new directions, the Sophist, at least on occasion,
is informed by, returns to, and supplements
substantive discussions in the Theaetetus.
In what follows, I aim to highlight another
such point of contact between the two dialogues. Specifically, I will present three comprehensively developed parallels between, on
the one hand, the Theaetetus’ discussion of the
flux theorists and their ‘secret doctrine’ and,
on the other hand, the Sophist’s discussion of
the giants in their fight against the ‘friends
of forms.’ I will show that [1] both passages
exhibit the same basic structure, in which two
substantive positions are presented on behalf of
two separate parties, related to one another by
their comparative sophistication or refinement,
and that [2] those parties and [3] their respective positions are characterized in remarkably
similar terms (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: sustained parallels in the Theaetetus-Sophist

Elements of these parallels have been observed previously, but they are almost always
mentioned only in passing, typically consigned
to footnotes.2 By focusing on them directly and
considering them as a group, I aim to support
a pair of related methodological theses. In particular, I submit, Plato’s efforts to wed these
sections of the Theaetetus and Sophist suggest
that an interpretation of the relevant part of
either dialogue both can inform and should
complement an interpretation of the other. If
correct, we will have a trove of fresh resources, from Plato himself no less, to guide our
interpretations of two of the most notoriously
challenging passages in the corpus.
Let me begin with the relevant section of
the Sophist (246a-249d). The Eleatic Visitor there presents ‘something like a battle between
gods and giants […] over being’ (246a4-5).3 The
battleground is ontology. Each party aims to
advance a ‘detailed account […] of that which
is’ (245e6).
From this introduction, one might expect
those on either side of the field to uniformly
hold a single view. But this is not the case. At
any rate, the giants, on whom I will focus,4
are hardly a monolithic group. They split into

two factions. At the outset of the battle, we
meet the first—the ‘crude giants,’ as I will call
them. They ‘insist that only what offers tangible contact is, since they define being as the
same as body’ (246a10-b1). Their initial foray,
then, consists in offering a view about both the
intension and the extension of being. What it
is to be, on the crude giants’ account, is to be a
body. Accordingly, all and only bodies—those
things affording tangible contact—are. 5
That identification of being and body leaves the crude giants immediately vulnerable
to attack and prefigures the introduction of a
second faction to take up their standard. The
trouble for the crude giants begins with the
extensional component of their thesis. Some of
the things that respectable Greeks would count
among beings do not seem to be bodies. 6 Of
special note are souls and the virtues.
Since the crude giants are said to be difficult—’perhaps just about impossible’ (246d1)—
to talk to, we cannot be certain whether they
would [i] admit souls and virtues as genuine
exceptions and so challenges to their thesis, [ii]
bite the bullet and preclude them from their
ontology, or like the Stoics after them,7 [iii]
take both souls and virtues to be bodies and
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so unproblematic. The Visitor suggests that the
crude giants, hardened in their ways, would
def lect the question, stubbornly reasserting
their thesis and failing to engage (247c4-5).
When challenged, they just ‘won’t listen […]
any more’ (246b3).
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as a definition9 that those which are amount
to nothing other than capacity’ (247d8-e4; cf.
248c4-5).

In the crude giants’ stead, the Visitor thus
questions some imagined ‘better people’ (246d7
and e2), whom I will call ‘refined giants.’ The
refined giants are partial to the view of their
crude compatriots but ultimately concede defeat on that front. ‘The soul seems to them to
have a kind of body,’ making it, if not a body, at
least bodily and so providing a small measure
of solace; ‘but as far as [the virtues] are concerned, they’re ashamed and don’t dare either
to agree that they are not beings or to insist
that they are all bodies’ (247b8-c2). Since the
refined giants will neither dismiss souls and
the virtues as nonbeings nor accept them as
bodies, options [ii] and [iii] are off the table.
This leaves only option [i] remaining. With the
soul and the virtues in mind, the refined giants
retreat from the crude position that everything
is a body and, with it, from the position that
being and body are the same.

This new position, as one commentator puts
it, ‘is not a complete abandonment’ of the crude
giants but rather ‘an attempt to articulate the
spirit of their original position, in a way that accommodates the Visitor’s counterargument.’10
Its emphasis on capacity (dunamis) is distilled
from the introduction of bodies as whatever
is causally salient. For the crude giants, the
noteworthy mark of a body was that it afforded tangible contact (246a10).11 Bodies, that
is, were first presented as having a particular
kind of capacity for action or passion. The refined giants thus home in on the only feature
of bodies that the crude giants had singled out
for attention and present it in its pure, unadulterated form. That is, the refined giants are not
merely possessed of a better, or more refined,
character than their crude compatriots; their
position refines that of their crude compatriots
as well. And that latter refinement is of no small
significance. It allows the refined giants to treat
souls and the virtues alongside bodies,12 thus
disarming the Visitor’s challenge.

To retrench, the Visitor claims, they have
to reflect upon the various kinds of beings that
they recognize—namely, bodies and now souls
and the virtues as well—and determine what
is common among them that might qualify
them all as beings (247d2-4).8 Since the refined
giants are not present to speak for themselves,
Theaetetus and the Visitor suggest a new, more
fortified position on their behalf. The refined
giants are thus agreed to advance the view that
‘a thing really is if it has any capacity at all,
either by nature to do something to something
else or to have even the smallest thing done to
it by even the most trivial thing;’ they ‘take it

With that survey of the giants’ tours of duty
complete, I turn now to the Theaetetus’ fluxists
and begin to draw parallels between the two.
The fluxists make their entrance in connection
with Theaetetus’ proposal that ‘knowledge is
simply perception’ (151e2-3). Socrates will disabuse him of that view, but the path forward
is long and largely indirect. For the most part,
Socrates’ objections are leveled at one of two
theses that Theaetetus’ proposed definition of
knowledge is purported to imply:13 the familiar,
Protagorean dictum that ‘man is the measure of
all things’ (152a2-3) and a much less familiar,
‘secret doctrine’ (152c10) held by some ‘fluent
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fellows’ (181a4), who are commonly referred to
in the secondary literature as ‘flux theorists,’
or ‘fluxists.’14
Initially, it seems as if the fluxists are most
concerned to advance a theory of perception
and some related theses in the philosophy of
language. But as it turns out, these are derivative parts of their doctrine. At its core, Socrates
claims, the secret doctrine presents an ontology. As he puts it, their various claims about
perception and language ‘begin from the principle [archê] that everything is really motion
and there is nothing besides motion’ (156a3-5).
I discuss that principle below. What is important to observe at the outset is that just as
the Sophist presented two factions of giants,
so, too, the Theaetetus presents two factions
of fluxists. Before introducing the heart of the
secret doctrine, Socrates issues a warning. We
must take care, he says, that ‘none of the uninitiated are listening’ (155e3). What can one
say about this latter group? To begin, they are
obviously not party to the content of the secret doctrine, for otherwise there would be no
reason to avoid expressing it in their presence.
Nonetheless, they cannot simply be identified
with those who have not yet come to know the
secret doctrine, for otherwise Theaetetus would
count among their ranks, and Socrates would
not go on to present it to him.15 Instead, they are
broadly in league with those already initiated,
but they stand, as of yet, separated off; much
like fraternity pledges, they are candidates for
being brought into the fold.
Further, the uninitiated are distinguished
from their initiated compatriots by their comparative lack of refinement. They are said to be
‘very crude people [amousoi]’ (Theait. 156a2)
relative to the ‘much more refined [polu komp-

soteroi]’ initiates (156a2).16 That is, the uninitiated are the crude counterparts to a faction
of more refined fluxists, standing to them just
as the crude giants stood in relation to their
more civilized and sophisticated compatriots
(Soph. 246c9, d7, and e2).17
The crude giants are further characterized
in two ways that even more powerfully liken
them to the Sophist’s crude giants. First, Plato
describes them in corporeal terms, associating
them with the earth especially. They are ‘hard
to the touch [sklêros]’ and ‘resistant [antitupous]’ (Theait. 155e7-156a1),18 making them
firm examples of bodies, as the crude giants
describe them, which ‘offer tangible contact’
(Soph. 246a10).19 The nature of their development is even more telling. We learn that ‘There
are no pupils and teachers among these people.
They just spring up on their own [automatoi
anaphusontai]’ (Theait. 180b9-c1). That final
expression models their genesis on that of plants, growing of themselves from the earth. This
finds an analogue in the Visitor’s description
of the crude giants as ‘earth people [gêgeneis]’
(Soph. 248c1), ‘grown from seed [spartoi]’ and
‘sprung from the land itself [autochthones]’
(247c5). 20
And second, much as the crude giants are
‘just about impossible’ to converse with (Soph.
246d1), one cannot have a philosophical discussion with a crude f luxist ‘any more than
[one] could with a maniac’ (Theait. 179e5-6).
The trouble, as in the case of the crude giants,
who could not be compelled to ‘answer less
wildly’ (Soph. 246d6), is that the crude fluxists
are restless. As Theodorus’ puts it: ‘As for abiding by what is said, or sticking to a question,
or quietly answering and asking questions in
turn, there is less than nothing21 of that in their
capacity’ (Theait. 179e7-180a2). 22
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The crude fluxists resemble the crude giants
not only in description but also in doctrine. Their
insistence that ‘nothing exists but what they
can grasp with both hands’ (Theait. 155e4-5)
very nicely tracks the crude giants’ insistence
‘that only what offers tangible contact is’ (Soph.
246a10-b1). 23 Indeed, their view is even more
forcefully recalled by a later summation of the
crude giants’ position: namely, that ‘anything
they can’t squeeze in their hands is absolutely
nothing’ (Soph. 247c5-7). 24 These giants thus
approach the battlefield ‘clutching rocks and
trees with their hands’ (246a8-9)—that is, clinging to the tangible bodies on the ground, in
contrast to the invisible beings that the friends
of forms, their foes, champion from more ethereal climes.
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(164e6) and ‘take their doctrine out of their
hands and consider it for ourselves’ (180c5-6).
Whether someone actually holds the doctrine
in question is incidental to the discussion. As
a result, the refined fluxists are not so much
advocates of a position as they are placeholders
for anyone who might (be tempted to) advance
it. 26 Similarly, in the Sophist, Theaetetus and
the Visitor agree to deal with the crude giants’
intransigency ‘by making them actually better
than they are […] in words’ (246d4-5). As a
consequence, the focus must again be more
on the position than on those who hold it. As
the Visitor says, ‘we’re not concerned with the
people; we’re looking for what’s true’ (246d8-9).

These parallels cannot but be deliberate on
Plato’s part. The crude fluxists and the crude
giants are presented as being one and the same,
as are their positions. Since we have seen that
each of these crude factions is compared to
a more refined one, we should expect to find
further parallels in Plato’s presentations of
their more refined compatriots and their more
refined positions. The texts push, albeit less
forcefully, precisely in that direction.

What, then, can we say about the ways in
which their respective doctrines are presented?
At first glance, frankly, they would appear to
be at odds. That of the refined giants is framed
in terms of capacity (dunamis). Their central
tenet, to recall, is that ‘those which are amount
to nothing other than capacity’ (Soph. 247e34). That of the refined f luxists, by contrast,
is framed in terms of motion (kinêsis). Their
central tenet is that ‘everything is really motion
and there is nothing besides motion’ (Theait.
156a3-5).

Apart from their relative refinement, which
should be regarded as an initial parallel, neither
the nobler fluxists nor giants are particularly
well described. There is accordingly little to
compare across Plato’s characterizations of
each. That absence of characterization, however, should itself be regarded as a further parallel in Plato’s presentation, for its explanation
is in each case the same: namely, both camps
are ultimately presented as being fictional. 25
Because the Theaetetus’ crude fluxists are not
capable of conversation, Socrates, Theaetetus,
and Theodorus agree to ‘come to the rescue’

There are, nevertheless, two principle classes of parallels that serve to largely bridge that
difference in framing and more broadly align
the two doctrines. 27 The first class bears directly on their central claims. To begin, we
may note, both are ontological. Both, further, appeal to a single criterion (capacity;
motion). 28 And in each case, that criterion is
similarly dichotomous. For the refined giants,
there are two basic kinds of capacities, those
for action and those for passion (Soph. 247e1,
248c5 and 7). Likewise, for the refined fluxists, ‘there are two kinds of motion, […] the one
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having the capacity to act and the other the
capacity to be acted upon’ (Theait. 156a5-7,
trans. after McDowell).
Their central claims are thus related not
only in structure but also in content, as both
use capacities for action and passion to ground their respective doctrines. 29 This parallel
is strengthened by a common conception of
actions and passions and, thus, of the capacities for them. First, both assume that actions
and passions just are motions. In light of their
treatment of the two kinds of motion, I take it
that this is obvious for the refined fluxists. 30
But one also finds the assumption operative
in the Sophist, where those in the grips of the
refined giants’ doctrine find it inevitable that,
for example, if being known is a passion, ‘then
insofar as [a thing] is known, it’s moved [kineisthai]’ (248e3-4).31 Accordingly, both parties
assume that capacities, generally, are capacities
for motion. 32 Second, both assume that actions
and passions are systematically interrelated.
In particular, for every action there is a distinct, complementary and reciprocal passion,
and vice versa. The refined fluxists thus speak
of their ‘twin births’ (Theait. 156b1), and the
refined giants assume, for example, that ‘if
knowing is doing something, then necessarily
[anagkaion] what is known has something done
to it’ (Soph. 248d10-e1). Accordingly, both assume that the capacities for those actions and
passions are analogously paired. 33
A second, indirect class of parallels obtains
between the corollaries drawn, in each dialogue,
from those central ontological claims. Before
addressing them, however, a preliminary point
is in order. In the Sophist, those corollaries are
revealed in the Visitor’s treatment of the giants’
opponents, the friends of forms, who initially
accept a qualified version of the refined giants’

capacity doctrine. At this point in the exchange,
the friends of forms alter the capacity doctrine
only by qualifying its scope. The doctrine applies
in full, they allege, to everything that the refined
giants recognize in the ontology (that is, as the
friends of forms would put it, to the entire domain of coming-to-be); yet there is also, on their
view, a more exalted domain of imperceptible,
non-bodily forms to which the capacity doctrine
does not apply (248c1-9). The friends of forms
are thus a valuable source for the refined giants’
capacity doctrine.
Two points in that discussion are especially
striking. First, insofar as they hold the capacity
doctrine, the friends of forms are said to ‘break
[bodies] up into little bits and call each a process of coming-to-be instead of being’ (Soph.
246b9-c2). This cannot but recall the refined
fluxists’ claim that each body is an ‘aggregate
[hathroismati]’ of ‘becomings’ that resist description in terms of ‘the verb “to be”’ (Theait.
157b1-c3; cf. 152d7-e1). Second, and even more
notably, the friends of forms take perception to
be the analogue of knowledge in the domain of
coming-to-be (Soph. 248a10-11). Since, again,
this is only domain that the refined giants admit, the implication is that knowledge is no
mere analogue of perception for the refined
giants; it just is perception. That is to say, the
refined giants are presented as being committed to the single most dialectically significant
corollary of the refined fluxists’ position—namely, the claim that ‘knowledge is simply perception’ (Theait. 151e2-3). 34 All told, I submit,
we thus have considerable evidence for strongly
associating the refined fluxists with the refined giants and for strongly associating their
respective positions.
If, as these parallels suggest, the Theaetetus’
fluxists and the Sophist’s giants are, at the very
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least, philosophical kin, then our interpretative
approach to these dialogues should be dramatically altered. On the one hand, we are licensed
to draw upon, and would do well consult, the
relevant section of one dialogue to inform and
advance an interpretation of that of the other.
On the other hand, we are at the same time
constrained, in that an interpretation of the
one should not, on the whole, fail to broadly
compliment an interpretation of the other. In
each respect, standard interpretations of the
Theaetetus-Sophist will require revision and
supplementation. My hope is that we are now
better poised to determine the form that those
emendations should take. 35
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NOTES
1
Unless otherwise noted, translations of Plato’s
works follow those in Cooper 1997.
2
Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9 notes parallel [1].
McDowell 1973, 137 hints at something along the lines
of [2] or [3], components of which are registered more
explicitly if briefly by Benardete 1984, I.108 n. 10; II.41
n. 65 and 130 n. 73, Centrone 2008, n. 106 and 107,
Cornford 1935, 48 n. 2, Karfík 2011, 124 and 131, Klein
1977, 89, Notomi 1999, 217 n. 21, Polansky 1992, 96,
Ross 1953, 102–103, Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9, Seeck 2011, 74
n. 62, Špinka 2011, 232, Teisserenc 2012, 74, 76, and 78,
Waterfield 1987, 38 n. 2, and Wiehl 1967, n. 74 and n.
78. Many prominent commentaries—e.g., Bluck 1975,
Bostock 1988, Burnyeat 1990, Chappell 2005, Cooper
1990, Duerlinger 2005, Heidegger 1997, Migliori 2007,
Rosen 1983, Rijk 1986, and Seligman 1974—neglect to in
any way address these parallels. Campbell 1861 and 1867
and Gonzalez 2011 are exceptions to prove the rule both
in consistently comparing the two passages and in doing
so more than merely in passing.
3
Combat metaphors run throughout and
frame this section of the Sophist. Notomi 1999, 217 n. 22
presents an extensive catalogue.
The Theaetetus’ fluxists are similarly engaged
in battle: ‘There is no small fight going on about [their
conception of being], anyway—and no shortage of
fighting men’ (179d4-5). Indeed, as a group, they form ‘an
army led by Homer’ (153a1-2) and wage a ‘most vigorous
campaign’ to advance their theory (179d8). For extended
discussion, see Nercam 2013.
4
The giants’ side of the fight grounds most of
the parallels that I will draw, below, to the Theaetetus
5
On the connection between body and tangible
contact, see note 11 below.
6
Note, for example, Theaetetus’ emphatic
responses at Soph. 246e6-247a4.
7
On the Stoics’ engagement with this passage
in the Sophist, see the excellent study by Brunschwig
1994. Sellars 2010, for a different assessment, is suspicious
of a connection.
8
The assumption that all beings will have some
one thing in common in virtue of which they are beings
is accepted by all parties. It is hardly innocent, however.
Aristotle’s focal analysis of being is a clear, ancient alternative. Wittgensteinean family resemblance is a modern
one.
9
There is a large body of literature on whether
‘horos’ should be translated as ‘definition’ or, less
strongly, ‘mark.’ For a recent overview of and engaging
contribution to the debate, see Leigh 2010. While I am
inclined to think ‘definition’ the better option, nothing
below will depend on how one decides the question. Since
I am arguing for a pair of methodological claims about
how one should approach interpreting the Theaetetus and
the Sophist, I aim to keep substantive interpretive claims
to a minimum.
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10
Beere 2009, 7. His development of the point
comes in three stages. Mine, in the remainder of the
paragraph, overlaps with the first of them.
11
The refined giants will later associate body
with visibility as well (247b3-5). Body is similarly marked
by tangibility and visibility in the Timaeus (31b4 especially). Contrast both Platonic passages with Aristotle’s
view, on which the primary mark of a body is instead to
be extended in all three dimensions (e.g., DC I.1, 268a6-8).
For Aristotle, tangibility is a mark of bodies not as such
but only insofar as they are perceptible (GC II.2, 329b6-7).
12
How, precisely, the refined giants’ position
accommodates the earlier problem cases is not specified
in the text. Crivelli suggests, plausibly to my mind, that
a soul or a virtue might count as a being for the refined
giants since each ‘causes people to act in ways in which
they would not in its absence’ and thus ‘may be described
as having the power of affecting things in [… having] the
quasi-causal power of making them be in certain ways’
(2012, 87). But what matters is simply that the refined
giants’ position does, somehow or other, allow them to
admit souls and the virtues as beings.
13
While my argument will not depend upon the
point, I agree with Burnyeat 1982, esp. pp. 5–6, with n. 2
that the basic argumentative structure of this section of
the Theaetetus is a reductio: knowledge is not perception
since various implications of that view are absurd. Chappell 2005, 51 shows that this conception of the argument’s
structure is compatible with both unitarian and revisionist readings of the text (i.e., with both the A reading and
the B reading [on which, see Burnyeat 1990, 7–10]), and
I intend to remain neutral with respect to those options
here.
14
Socrates attributes the ‘secret doctrine’ to
Protagoras, but the very fact that it is presented as a
‘secret’ raises a question about the grounds for pinning it
to his historical namesake (on which, see Brancacci 2011).
And indeed, as soon as Socrates raises the doctrine, he
rebrands it as a kind of ancient wisdom, something with
respect to which ‘all the wise men of the past […] stand
together’ (152e2-3). In the lines that follow, Heraclitus,
Empedocles, Epicharmus, and Homer are all placed in
Protagoras’ company. Parmenides is notable for being
explicitly excepted. Melissus is later said to be in league
with him (180e2 and 183e3).
15
Nor, conversely, does someone count among
the initiates simply for being familiar with the theory.
Socrates presents neither himself nor the fluxists’ primary
opponents as having been initiated.
16
I have substituted Levett and Burnyeat’s
translation (in Cooper 1997) of ‘kompsoteroi’ with an
alternative from LSJ.
17
There are at least two senses of ‘refined’ operative in each passage. First, the refined fluxists and the
refined giants are both comparatively ‘gentle’ in character.
This sense of ‘refinement’ is particularly evident, I submit,
in their relative willingness to engage in discussion (I comment further on this feature of Plato’s presentation below).
Second, the refined fluxists and the refined giants are both
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comparatively ‘clever.’ The crude fluxists are uneducated,
as ‘amousos’ implies, as are, by their own admission, the
crude giants since education, culture, intelligence, and the
like are neither tangible nor visible.
In both passages, assessments of comparative
refinement can be made not only synchronically (e.g.,
Theait. 156a2 and Soph. 246d7-8) but also diachronically.
This is because the interlocutors recognize a process of
refinement in each passage—namely, initiation in the
Theaetetus and betterment in the Sophist (246d4-5).
The treatment of that process is perhaps significant. In the Theaetetus, nothing explicit is said about the
way in which the crude and refined fluxists’ respective positions are related. Yet, the initiation metaphor is suggestive. As Plato presents it elsewhere, an initiation culminates in the initiate changing her mind (Meno 76e6-9), in
the face of dialectical puzzles (Euthydemus 277d-e), but
by refining her positions rather than simply jettisoning
them (Phaedo 69b-c). Notably, in Socrates’ own initiation,
that movement leads away from the particular bodies,
and even body generally, that the uninitiated are presented as focusing upon (Symposium 210a-b). Admittedly,
though, this reconstruction is too speculative to count as
compelling, let alone decisive, evidence of a parallel.
18
I have substituted Levett and Burnyeat’s
translation (in Cooper 1997) of ‘sklêros’ and ‘antitupous’
with alternatives from LSJ.
19
Compare Timaeus 31b5-6: ‘nothing could ever
become […] tangible without something solid, nor solid
without earth.’
Campbell 1861, 50 n. 9 ties ‘sklêros’ and ‘antitupous’ to Plato’s description of the crude giants along a
different line. The ‘hard and repellent’ crude fluxists, he
submits, recall the Sophist’s terrible or fearsome giants
(246b4: deinous).
20
I have substituted White’s translation (in Cooper 1997) of ‘spartoi’ and ‘autochtones’ with alternatives
from LSJ.
21
Campbell 1861, 124 finds an echo of this
phrase, ‘less than nothing [pros to mêde smikron],’ in
Soph. 248c5’s ‘by even the smallest thing [pros to smikrotaton].’ On the other hand, he denies that the difficulty
in talking with the crude fluxists is the same as that in
talking with the crude giants (1867, 120); I take Soph.
246d6, quoted above, to meet the worry he raises.
22
An anonymous referee rightly notes that
Theaetetus 179e-180c, on which I have drawn both in this
paragraph and the one prior, does not unambiguously
refer to the crude fluxists. An important indicator that
this is, indeed, the way to take the reference comes in
Theodorus’ description of those in question as those ‘who
profess to be adepts [prospoiountai empeiroi]’ (179e4-5).
Since ‘prospoieô’ connotes pretending (LSJ points to Gorgias 519c3 for this coloring of the verb), the description
can be paraphrased as ‘those who profess to be but are not
in fact initiates.’
23
The crude fluxists go on to deny ‘that actions
and processes and the invisible world in general have any
place in reality’ (155e5-6). The last component of that de-
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nial reveals a conception of body as tangible and visible,
in that order. See note 11, above. The first two components further liken them to the crude giants, who also do
not admit capacities, unlike their refined compatriots.
On this point, I disagree with Benardete, who takes the
crude giants to ‘deny […] the changeable’ (1984, I.108).
They deny changes (or, at least, deny that changes are
fundamental), not the bodies capable of change.
24
Campbell 1861, 50 n. 6; 1867, 123 n. 1 is
particularly sensitive to resemblances among Plato’s
formulations of the crude fluxists’ and giant’s positions.
25
Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9 notes the parallel;
Diès 1992, 109 n. 3 links the passages I use to support
it. Whether this is merely a matter of presentation is a
separate question that I will not here address.
It is notable for Plato to develop a position
on behalf of no one in particular. Indeed, Brown 1998,
182 observes that, in the early and middle dialogues,
Plato is unlikely to develop a position even on behalf of a
determinate proponent who is neither participating in the
conversation nor present for it.
26
Protagoras and others are no doubt regularly
associated with the doctrine, but at critical junctures it
is explicitly wrested from them and developed independently. Presumably in relation, the refined fluxists’
central tenet is called a ‘veiled truth’ (155d10) hidden
within what was already said to be a ‘secret doctrine’
(152c10).
27
Ross 1953, 102–103, Benardete 1984, II.41
n. 65, Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9, Centrone 2008, n. 107, and
Karfík 2011, 124 are among those who liken the refined
fluxists’ and refined giants’ respective doctrines. While
the parallels that I will present are perhaps insufficient to
completely bridge the gap between capacity and motion,
and so to simply identify the two doctrines (on this point,
see Gonzalez 2011, 69–70), they reveal deep and pervasive
agreements between those doctrines that are, I submit,
sufficient to motivate the pair of methodological theses
that I ultimately have in view.
28
On the significance of a commitment to a
single criterion, see note 8, above.
29
Gonzalez notes the parallel, observing that, in
both passages, ‘all things are identified with a dunamis of
either ποιεῖν or παθεῖν’ (2011, 70).
30
While, so far as I can see, there is no cause
to doubt that, for the refined fluxists, all actions and
passions are motions, the status of the converse claim—
that all motions are actions and passions—is less certain.
Though I suspect the refined fluxists would accept it as
well, I am not relying on the latter claim for the parallel
in the body of the paper.
31
Similarly, in a related context, the Visitor
glosses ‘action and passion’ as ‘motion’ and ‘that which
acts or is acted upon’ as ‘that which moves’ (Soph. 249b2).
The inference in the body of the paper, it bears noting,
is not presented directly on behalf of the refined giants.
Rather, Theaetetus and the Visitor treat it as an implication of their doctrine when demarcating them from the
friends of forms, who accept a qualified form of the doc-

trine. I discuss the evidential import of the passage below.
32
Leigh 2010, 76 emphasizes this point in her
discussion of the Sophist. It is not trivial that capacities
should be conceived of exclusively as capacities for motion. Focusing on the Sophist as well, Beere 2009, 12–13
proposes that the difficulties arising in relation to this
position prompt Aristotle to introduce both activities that
are not also motions and, with them, capacities that are
not also capacities for motion.
This link between capacity and motion may
also help to explain why, in the Sophist, the giants’
opponents, the friends of forms, might present their own
position as denying that being has any share of motion,
rather than as denying a claim about capacities directly.
Just as the fluxists’ opponents proclaim that being is
‘unmoving’ and ‘stands still’ (Theait. 180b2, 180e1-3, and
183d1), the friends of forms maintain that ‘being always
stays the same and in the same state’ (Soph. 248a12).
33
The systematic coupling of capacities for
action and passion, though not uncommon in the
corpus (see, e.g., Rep. VI, 507e6 ff. and Leg. X, 903b4-9),
is similarly nontrivial. To draw a comparison with the
Charmides, it would preclude a capacity, like knowledge,
from acting upon itself (cf. Barnes 2001, 79).
34
Seeck 2011, 78 n. 70 draws a related parallel to
Theait. 184b7-185a7.
35
I owe the impetus for this paper to Charles
Kahn and Susan Meyer, who encouraged me to develop
and support its central thesis, a version of which I
had rather flatly asserted in a footnote to my doctoral
dissertation. I am also grateful to Francisco Gonzalez,
two anonymous referees, and audiences at Portland State
University and an SAGP meeting at Fordham University
for comments on drafts.

